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Average Farm Prices 
Received By Iowa Farmers 
Dec Nov Nov 
1994 1994 1993 
$/Bushel 
Corn 2.04 1.97 2.65 
Soybeans 5.33 5.33 6.63 
Oats 1.33 1.40 1.58 
$ffon 
Alfalfa 81.00 79.00 101.00 
All Hay 78.00 76.00 97.00 
$/Cwt. 
Steers & Heifers 71.10 67.60 71.20 
Feeder Calves 76.80 75.00 87.40 
Cows 37.20 36.80 43.80 
Barrows & Gilts 31.20 29.30 43.90 
Sows 21.00 20.60 31.60 
Sheep 37.10 33.70 31.90 
Lambs 66.90 72.50 65.50 
$/Lb 
Turkeys 0.42 0.45 0.41 
$/Dozen 
Eggs 0.52 0.51 0.52 
$/Cwt. 
All Milk 12.50 12.60 13.80 
$/Head 
Milk Cows NA NA 1,140 
Iowa Farm Income Indicators 
1994 1993 1992 
Million Dollars 
Crop Cash Receipts 
Jan - Aug Total 2,001 2,716 2,735 
Livestock Cash Receipts 
Jan - Aug Total 3,587 3,846 3,700 
significantly smaller in normal years. For example, for 
the 1994 corn crop, CARD estimates that the first five 
months of the 1994/95 market will generate an average 
corn price of $2.08 per bushel. However, the 12 
month average price is projected to be $2.15 per 
bushel, $0.07 per bushel higher. This means that the 
deficiency payment rate for the 1994 crop will be 
$0.07 per bushel lower because the l2 month price is 
used instead of the 5 month price. The 1993 legisla-
lion did limit the amount that the deficiency payment 
rate could be reduced by swi£ching from the 5 month 
price calculation to the 12 month calculation. For 
com and sorghum, this limit was set at $0.07 per 
busheL Therefore, even if the l2 month price turned 
out to be $2.20 per bushel in the above example, the 
deficiency payment rate would still only be reduced by 
$0.07 dollars per bushel. 
One other change that will take effect with the 1994 
crop is the timing of deficiency payments. This change 
affects only com and sorghum. Advanced deficiency 
payments are still made at the time. of sign-up. How-
ever, midterm deficiency payments for corn and 
sorghum which are typically made in March of the year 
following the harvest will be reduced in two ways. 
First, deficiency pay;ments will be reduced because an 
estimated l2 month price calculation will be used as 
described above. Second, only 75 percent of the 
estimated payment will be paid in. March. The 
remaining 25 percent will not be paid out until 
September when the actuall2 month price is deter-
mined. This shifts 25 percent of midterm cash pay-
ments to producers from March to September, delaying 
this cash flow for producers. 
CARD/FAPRI Analysis 
The Budgetary and Resource Allocation 
Effects of Revenue Assurance: Summary of 
Results 
(Dermot]. Hayes: Associate Professor of Economics 
515 294-6185) 
(Bruce A. Babcock: Associate Professor of Economics 
515 294-5764) 
(David Hennessy: Assistant Professor of Ag1icultural 
Economics, Washington State University) 
One of the more intriguing alternatives under consid-
eration for the 1995 farm bill is the "Iowa Plan.'' This 
idea originated with a group oflowa's farm and 
commodity organizations. lt is receiving increased 
attention from national farm organizations, academics, 
and politicians. The basic premise is very simple. 
Rather than tbe currenL mixture of target prices, 
disaster payments, set-aside provisions, and crop 
insurance, the government would underwrite a 
program that guarantees producers a certain percent-
age of recent revenues. The idea has much intuitive 
appeal because farmers (and their bankers) would be 
assured of a certain revenue figure regardless of what 
happens to prices or yields. 
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Because current programs often result in large defi-
ciency payments when yields are also high, and low 
deficiency payments in drought years, there is a sense 
that money arrives when it is not needed and fails to 
arrive when it is needed. Consequently, it appears 
possible that with revenue assurance the government 
might cut its costs while improving the welfare or 
farmers. 
With these ideas in mind, CARD has recently begun an 
in-depth analysis of the lowa Plan. The first part of 
this project has been completed and results are now 
available. The paper is CARD Working Paper 95-WP 
130 "The Budgetary and Resource Allocation Effects of 
Revenue Assurance" by David A. Hennessy, Bruce A. 
Babcock, and Dermot]. Hayes. Please refer to that 
paper for more details of the analysis. Here we summa-
rize some of its more important findings. 
The Importan ce of Contract Details 
Before one evaluates the impact of revenue assurance, 
detail is required on exactly how the program would 
be implemented. However, before policymakers can 
agree on the details, they need to know more about the 
likely impact of the proposal itself. In an atrempt to 
get around this "catch-22" situation, our first look at 
the program is to examine how a representative lowa 
corn-soybean farmer would respond to various 
contract specifications. One advantage of this farm-
level focus is that we have excellent information on 
how yields and prices have moved over time as well as 
on how rotations influence yields and costs. Thus, we 
can match up details about the representative farm 
with details about the revenue assurance program. A 
second advantage of this farm-level approach is that we 
can get an accurate idea of what alternative revenue 
assurance programs will cost and the magnitude of the 
associated program benefits. 
Contract Details 
(a) Should revenue assurance be offer ed on a 
whole farm level, or should it be offered on a crop-
by-crop basis? 
One can make good intuitive arguments for either 
approach and both are compared here. 
(b) Should county average yields or farm specific 
yields be used when calculating revenue? 
There is a trade-off between the accuracy of the 
program and the amount of bureaucracy required to 
lowll Ag Review 
run iL. We compare the government costs and benefits 
to producers of both programs. 
(c) What percentage of expected revenue sh ould 
the progra~n assure? 
The answer depends in part on how much the govern-
ment can spend and the level o[ expected benefits at 
the different assurance levels. We ran the numbers for 
70, 80, 90, and 100 percent revenue assurance, but 
report only on the 80 and 100 percent options. 
(d) Should revenues be calculated based on what 
the fa rmer actually plants or on what has been 
grown historically? 
Here the answer is less straightforward. Using actual 
plantings would cause some producers to adopt high-
risk crops and cropping practices, and consequently 
the program itself would distort the market. Our sense 
is that revenue assurance was proposed to remove 
market disruptions and, consequently, we used 
historical plantings to calculate revenues. Note 
however, that we do use actual (simulated) yields and 
prices to calculate per-acre revenues. 
(e) How s hould producer benefits be measured? 
Revenue assurance and deficiency payment schemes 
are put in place to reduce the amount of risk associated 
with farming. 1f risk were not an issue, the govern-
men t could simplify things greatly and merely write 
checks. The way we incorporate the effect of risk is as 
follows: We calculate the amount of money typical 
producers would accept for certain in exchange for the 
rislly outcome they might otherwise face . For ex-
ample, suppose a farmer expects to make an average 
of $50,000 per year raising hogs, but would be just as 
happy making $45,000 per year raising hogs if all the 
revenue uncertainty associated with raising hogs were 
eliminated. Then we can say that the certainty 
equivalent of a $50,000 per year hog operation is 
$45,000. Here $50,000 is the "expected revenue" and 
$45,000 is the "certainty equivalem" returns. 
The lllustrative farm 
We chose a 500-acre com-soybean farm in Iowa's 
Sioux County. Results are presented for two producers 
who vary according to the level of ris k they wish to 
face. The less risk averse producer is more wUiing to 
trade increased risk for increased expected returns 
than the more risk averse producer. This trade-off is 
accomplished by moving away from the benefits of a 
corn-soybean rotation towards a rotation that 
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emphasizes the program crop, com. At first glance it 
would seem that com is actually less risky than 
soybeans because of government subsidies, but corn 
yields and corn prices are more variable than soybean 
yields and prices, and crop diversification leads to 
substantial decreases in the variability of farm returns. 
The farm is enrolled in the target price program and 
both types of producers are assumed to purchase 
federal crop insurance. Expected harvest time sales 
prices are $2.21/bu for com and $6.17/bu for soybeans. 
Base yield is 112.1 bushels/ac. Expected yield this year 
is 137.6 bu/ac when com follows beans and 124.5 bu/ 
ac in continuous com. We used production costs 
estimated by Iowa State University Extension farm 
management specialists. 
Results 
Table l presents estimates of the effects of moving 
from the present program to a free market and to 
revenue assurance. The basic assumption behind these 
results is that the producer chooses acreage to maxi-
mize certainty equivalent returns. Under the current 
program, the proportion of acreage devoted to com 
depends on the assumed level of risk aversion. The less 
risk averse producer plants significantly more com 
than soybeans and the more risk averse producer 
essentially plants under a corn-soybean rotation. Only 
farm level revenue assurance results are presented in 
Table l. Revenue assurance results based on county 
average revenue are provided in the full study. 
Under the free market op tion and all the revenue 
assurance options, the producer finds that a corn-
soybean rotation is optimal. Thus, the first result is 
that for this farm, revenue assurance results in the 
same acreage allocation as would occur under the free 
market scenario. That is, there are no dis tortionary 
effects of revenue assurance. There are two 
distortionary effects of the current program. First, 
productive land is idled: 22 acres for the less risk 
averse producer and 17 acres for the more risk averse 
producer (who has less corn base). Second, for the 
less risk averse producer, corn defickncy payments 
induce greater production of corn. That is, this farmer 
finds it optimal to "farm the program" by increasing 
land plan ted to corn. 
Expected government costs of revenue assurance are 
substantially less than under the current program. For 
example, government costs under 80 percent crop 
specific assurance are reduced by 92 percent for the 
less ri9k averse producer and by 90 percent for the 
more risk averse producer. Under 100 percent crop 
specific assurance. costs are 55 percent less than the 
current program for the less risk averse producer and 
44 percent less for the more risk averse producer. The 
cost reduction is even greater under whole farm 
assurance. Producer certainty equivalent returns also 
fall under revenue assurance, but by a lesser amount 
than the drop in government costs. This suggests that 
the efficiency of government payments increases. For 
example, the current program raises the certainty 
equivalent returns of the less risk averse producer by 
about $14,000 over the free market level at a cost of 
more than $25,000. That is, it costs about $1.80 for 
each one dollar rise in certainty equivalent returns. In 
contrast, under 100 percent whole farm revenue 
assurance, certainty equivalent returns of the less risk 
averse producer increase by $10,757 at a cost of 
$9,498, which implies that each dollar transferred to 
producers increases certainty equivalent returns by 
$1.13. 
The efficiency increase with revenue assurance is even 
more pronounced for the more risk averse producer. 
The. current program increases certainty equivalent 
returns by about one dollar for each dollar transferred. 
But under revenue assu-rance, each dollar u·ansferred 
raises certainty equivalent returns by $1.69 under 100 
percent crop specific revenue assurance, by $1.97 
under 100 percent whole farm revenue assurance, by 
$2.61 under 80 percent crop specific revenue assur-
ance, and by $5.19 under 80 percent whole [arm 
revenue assurance. The reason why the efficiency of 
government payments is so much higher under 
revenue assurance relative to the current program is 
that revenue assurance pays only when revenue is low, 
which implies that the benefit of the payment is high. 
In contrast, the current program may pay large 
deficiency payments when revenue from the market is 
also high. 
A Note 011 Moral Hazard 
Much debate has gone into the issue of whether a 
revenue assurance program would cause farmers to 
change their behavior to take advantage of the pro-
gram. (Would Lhe program be a hazard for the morals 
of farmers?) The more we looked at this issue, the less 
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Table 1. Planting decisions, certainty equivalent returns, and expected government cos ts under alternative 
government programs 
Corn Soybean Government 
Program Acreage Acreage CER" Costs 
Less risk averse producer 
Current Program 
Free Market 
Revenue Assurance 
100% Crop Assurance 
100% Whole Farm 
80% Crop Specific 
80% Whole Farm 
311 167 
250 250 
250 250 
250 250 
250 250 
250 250 
$76,461 $25,141 
$62,490 $0 
$74,813 $11,178 
$73,247 $9,498 
$65,001 $2,024 
$63,618 $850 
More risk averse producer 
Current Program 
Free Market 
Revenue Assurance 
100% Crop Assurance 
100% Whole Farm 
80% Crop Specific 
80% Whole Farm 
239 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
" Denotes certainty equivalent returns 
important it became. For example, if we use county-
level yields and fix the base acreage, then there is 
nolhing that producers can do to cheat even if they 
want to. If we use individual yields, then it is possible, 
but highly unlikely, that farmers would "farm the 
program." Farmers might be tempted to cut fertilizer 
costs in years when prices are so low that they fully 
expect a payment on revenue assurance. However, as 
we discovered in the results discussed above, the 
chances of this occurring are very small. Also, we 
know from other research that it almost always pays to 
choose the correct amount of fertilizer. Please refer to 
CARD Working Paper 94-WP 127 "Input Demand 
Under Revenue Assurance," by Bruce A. Babcock and 
David A. Hennessy for more details about these results. 
There are program details that would raise moral 
hazard issues. For example a 100 percent revenue 
assurance program. based on farm specific yields and 
current (rather than historic) planting patterns would 
tempt some farmers to behave irresponsibly. However 
these problems can be eliminated by using common 
sense in the program design. We do not anticipate any 
real moral hazard p roblems with revenue assurance so 
long as the proportion assured remains below about 85 
percent, and historic rather than current acreage 
patterns are used. 
244 
250 
250 
250 
250 
250 
$70,668 
$55,199 
$70,038 
$67,378 
$59,584 
$56,440 
$15,728 
$0 
$8,768 
$6,188 
$1,679 
$239 
Revenue assurance would allow for much lower levels 
of government spending on agriculture, remove the 
distortions associated with existing programs, and 
dramatically improve the efficiency with which 
government agricultural program are run. Producer 
welfare, on the other hand, would decline under 
revenue assurance when compared to the existing 
program, except at a coverage level of 100 percent. At a 
100 percent coverage level, certainty equivalent returns 
are only slightly below the level under current pro-
grams but the corresponding government costs are cut 
approximately in half. If current proposals to reduce 
government spending on agriculture by decreasing 
deficiency payments were to pass, then revenue 
assurance would become an attractive alternative to 
current programs operated at a reduced level of 
support. 
FAPRI 1995 Baseline Results 
(Darnell B. Smitl1 515 294-1184) 
FAPRI's 1995 baseline, the benchmark numbers used 
as a reference point for policy analysis, was completed 
mid-January and presented to the U.S. House and 
Senate staffs on February 16-17, 1995. The ten-year 
projections, representing a composite of model results 
and judgments about future U.S. and international 
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